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The state has failed to manage religious conflicts. Not only from the side of the 
government apparatus, which helped provoke the mass to the loss of life, but also weak 
and biased central regulations. The fact is that national policies do not complete the 
agenda and content of interests. This study argues that an important deliberative policy is 
made in each conflict area as a reinforcement for national policy. We construct a 
deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts based on academic guidelines and the case of 
the Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in Colo Village, Kudus Regency, Central Java 
Province. This study is sourced from data collected in November 2018 through 
documentation, interviews, and observations. We have interviewed the village government, 
religious leaders, active congregations, and residents. The results of the interviews were 
processed through the process of transcription, determining keywords, categorizing, and 
defining. Data refined in October 2020 through literature studies and news clipping. We 
have described policies as triggers of conflict, identified four patterns of JAI conflict in 
Indonesia, and explained the dynamics of Ahmadiyya diversity with local Muslims in 
Colo. Primarily, this study contains a deliberative policy-making process. The key to this 
policy is a participatory, informative, balanced, and thorough discussion of all parties. 
The task in the future is the need to examine the deliberative policy flow that we have 







Negara telah gagal menangani konflik agama. Tidak hanya dari sisi aparatur 
pemerintah yang turut memprovokasi massa hingga korban jiwa, tetapi juga regulasi 
pusat yang lemah dan bias. Faktanya, kebijakan nasional tidak melengkapi agenda 
dan muatan kepentingan. Kajian ini berargumen bahwa kebijakan deliberatif penting 
dibuat di setiap wilayah konflik sebagai penguat kebijakan nasional. Kami membangun 
alur kebijakan deliberatif untuk konflik agama berdasarkan studi literatur dan kasus 
Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di Desa Colo, Kabupaten Kudus, Provinsi Jawa 
Tengah. Kajian ini bersumber dari data yang dikumpulkan pada bulan November 
2018 melalui dokumentasi, wawancara, dan observasi. Kami telah mewawancarai 
pemerintah desa, tokoh agama, jemaah aktif, dan warga. Hasil wawancara diolah 
melalui proses transkripsi, penentuan kata kunci, kategorisasi, dan pendefinisian. Data 
disempurnakan pada Oktober 2020 melalui studi literatur dan kliping berita. Kami 
telah menggambarkan kebijakan sebagai pemicu konflik, mengidentifikasi empat pola 
konflik JAI di Indonesia, dan menjelaskan tentang dinamika keberagaman 
Ahmadiyah dengan umat Islam lokal di Colo. Pada intinya, kajian ini berisi tentang 
proses pembuatan kebijakan yang bersifat deliberatif. Kunci dari kebijakan ini adalah 
diskusi yang partisipatif, informatif, seimbang, dan menyeluruh dari semua pihak. 
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Tugas ke depan adalah perlunya mengkaji alur kebijakan musyawarah yang telah 
dibangun untuk memastikan hal tersebut dapat diterapkan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, religion and conflict are two opposing phenomena. Religion brings 
balance, whereas conflict brings destruction to life. When met, a series of studies in various 
countries show the goodness of religion as a tool to rationalize violent behavior (Appleby 
2015; Rakodi 2013; Gopin 2002), although there is evidence to the contrary (Türkmen 
2018; Isaacs 2016; Basedau et al. 2011). According to Aho (2000), the contradiction 
between religion and conflict is caused by the overlapping needs of adherents. Religious 
doctrine is packaged in such a way as to support attitudes including, violence. This is in line 
with Basedau et al (2016) collecting data from 130 developing countries using logistic 
regression, finding that armed religious conflict is precisely the call of their religious leaders. 
There is fact justification for Huntington's (1996) thesis that religion is a source of conflict 
in a post-cold war state. 
Experience in many developing countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Bangladesh, India, shows that religion is a source of norms, values, and attitudes that 
influence the legal, economic, and political order. Countries with ties to religion must 
accept the consequences that come later. Intra and extra-religious conflicts within one 
country have often occurred (Basedau and Koos 2015; Svensson 2007; Ellingsen 2005; 
Juergensmeyer 1993). Especially in the Islam-Christian conflict (Horowitz 2009). In local 
Indonesia, Islam-Christian conflicts have occurred in Poso of Sulawesi and Ambon of 
Maluku (Qurtuby 2013), and Tolikara (Ridwan 2018). Also found in internal Islam: Sunni-
Shia (Rokhmad 2019), Gafatar (Makin 2019), Majlis Tafsir Al-Qur‘an (Alfandi 2013), and 
very proper attention to the continuation of the conflict of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya 
Jamaat (Suyatman 2017). 
The prolonged religious conflict indicates that the state has failed to manage. State 
failure is not only caused by weak regulations (Hasan 2017), but also state actors come into 
play. Suryana (2019) and Hicks (2014) found that state officials played a role in mass 
mobilization to launch protests against the Ahmadiyya group which ended up taking the 
law into their own hands. State officials not only provoke but also fabricate violence to gain 
access to state resources (Hilmy 2015; van Klinken 2007). Hilmy (2015) specifically 
highlighted the Sunni-Shia conflict found that apart from theological, political, and 
economic elements also played in which the role of the government together with the Kiai 
became the main focus. This in turn hampers the law enforcement process because state 
actors are entangled in relationships with the attackers. 
Laws and regulations do not guarantee the resolution of religious conflicts. Public 
policy from a top-down perspective has weaknesses in the area of control and supervision 
(Purwanto and Sulistiyastuti 2018; Dewi 2016; HM, Mualimin, and Nurliana 2018). 
Government regulation at one time is easily enforced in pockets of conflict, sometimes the 
other way around. Considering that Indonesia's territory is inhabited by people who have 
different ethnic, social, and cultural features, local solutions are needed. We consider it very 
necessary to present a deliberative policy (bottom-up perspective). 
This study argues that the deliberative policy is very important to be made in each 
conflict area. This will reinforce national policies that are considered incapable of resolving 
the agendas and other interests of the conflict. This argument will be proven through the 
reconciliation case of the conflict between the Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) and 
local Muslims in Colo Village, Kudus Regency, Central Java Province. 
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Muhammadiyah declared Ahmadiyah as an infidel group in 1929 with the main reason 
that ―there is no Prophet after Prophet Muhammad (Crouch 2009), followed by MUI 
(Indonesian Ulama Council) in the Second National Conference in 1980 with the status of 
Ahmadiyya as Heretical (reaffirmed in fatwa number 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005). 
This fatwa has become a guideline for Islamic groups to carry out several protests which 
often end up being anarchist. So that the government represented by the Minister of 
Religion, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General reduced the conflict by 
issuing a Joint Ministerial Decrees (SKB 3 Menteri) in 2008. The SKB had no significant 
impact. Data from Tempo (2011)  there have been 15 cases of violence, arson, and killings 
on the part of JAI. In 2020 there were 213 reports related to Ahmadiyya regarding the 
sealing of mosques, intimidation, accusations of heresy, and prohibition of socializing.  
This paper begins with an explanation of policies that should reconcile conflict but 
instead, turn around. Then, we tried to find patterns of JAI conflict in Indonesia, followed 
by field findings of the dynamics of diversity in Colo Village. These three sub-themes were 
presented to support our discussion which seeks to construct a deliberative policy flow for 
religious conflicts. This important finding is expected to guide policy. Thus, encouraging 
the government in conflict locations as facilitators to promote local communication. The 
study objectives were answered using qualitative methods with two data sources. Primary 
data were obtained from interviews in the form of explanations of the situation in Colo 
Village, conditions when conflicts occurred in other areas, patterns of interaction between 
residents, routine worship in each religion, and others. Then the observation was in the 
form of a description of the situation in Colo Village, the mosques around Colo Village, 
especially the Ahmadiyah mosque, including the religious situation. Secondary data were 
obtained through online news access, literature searches, and documentation related to JAI. 
Primary data was processed following the directions of Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Creswell  (2014): data transcripts, search for keywords in each interview sentence, 
categorization between keywords, and meaning. This data processing process is 
accompanied by triangulation.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Policy in the Ahmadiyya Conflict Circle 
This section tries to explain the condition of public policy in the context of religious 
conflict. Policies are born as government actions to solve various public problems. This 
official goal must be able to allocate the values contained in it. This is a challenge in policy, 
because every problem is inseparable from interests, desires, and values, whether they are 
directly related to citizens or policymakers. 
Graff et al (2016) believe that the existence of interests, values, plus limited resources 
in policies are 'buttons' that trigger conflict. So it can be said that public policy can raise 
two prevalences, namely as a problem solver on the one hand and a trigger for the problem 
on the other. Rationally correct, public policy exists as an authoritative mechanism for 
managing conflict (Lele 2016; de Graaf and Paanakker 2015). However, all conflicting 
values and interests of actors who are not coordinated when carrying out the agenda-
setting often create new conflicts or add to conflicts. 
Religious conflicts that were resolved by top-down mechanisms, if a closer look were 
made, could not fulfill the expectations of each actor. There are at least five contradictions 
that can be identified according to Lele (2016): 1) satisfying one actor and making another 
actor win-lose; 2) does not satisfy all lose-lose actors; 3) creating new conflicts between 
actors; 4) pushing the government into conflict, or the latter happened in the case of JAI. 
5) The existing conflict policy is used to punish other actors who are experiencing losing 
conflicts. These five contradictions in public policy are the impact of limitations in 
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allocating existing values and resources. Thus, practice in the field usually forces policy-
making actors to provide interests that are deemed unnecessary to accommodate larger 
interests. This does not mean that lesser interests need to be ignored - it usually occurs in 
minorities -. In some cases, it shows that there will be separate (special) policies that will be 
taken to accommodate these minority values or interests, such as the policy of assimilation 
or multiculturalism that is specifically given to ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
The Ministerial SKB 3 as a policy has disadvantaged of JAI. This policy contradicts its 
primary objective of mediating conflict and protecting the rights to diversity and life. We 
suspect that there has been bounded rationality or limited information held by the 
formulating actors or policymakers. Simon (1997) said, "...limits of human capability to 
calculate, the severe deficiencies in human knowledge about the consequences of choice, 
and the limits of the human ability to adjudicate among multiple goals." So that the SKB 3 
Minister creates new conflicts from this perspective, is something that is in line. 
Computational limitations that humans have are the cause of various values not being able 
to be fully accommodated in a policy text. 
This explanation does not intend to isolate public policy, on the contrary. This 
explanation tries to open discourse space for public policy to see conflict as an inseparable 
part of the policy itself. It is realized that looking at policy from the point of view of 
conflict seems to erode the essence of the policy itself. On the other hand, policies view 
conflict as something that must be avoided and even eliminated if necessary. The facts on 
the ground keep opening the eyes that conflicts in policy must get serious attention. Studies 
must be reproduced as a learning mechanism because policy and conflict are human 
civilizations. 
 
Ahmadiyya Conflict Pattern 
We started this discussion by tracing the series of conflicts of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat in 
various regions in Indonesia, then explaining the pattern of the conflict. This is intended as 
a comparison for later discussions between JAI's experiences in several parts of Indonesia 
and Colo Village, Central Java. Initially, Ahmadiyah was an Islamic movement that was 
born in India in the late 19th century under the leadership of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This 
movement was born as a response to the development of reformist and progressive 
Hinduism (Lavan 1974). All provided support for Ahmad's work, at least until Orthodox 
Muslims found various teachings that deviated from Islam (Batubara 2019). Ahmadiyah's 
heresy has split into two groups: Lahore and Qadian. The Lahore section accepted Ahmad 
as a reformer but not as a prophet, while Qadian accepted both. In its development, both 
Qadian and Lahore were opposed through deviant fatwas by Islamic scholars in India, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia (Crouch 2011).  
In Indonesia, Ahmadiyah has been present since 1923 and has grown rapidly until 
2000. The number of followers has reached 400,000 or 0.02% of the total Sunni Muslims, 
according to the Association of Religion Data Archives (2015). The movement remains 
divided into two parts: Ahmadiyah Qadian is called the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jamaat 
(JAI), and the Ahmadiyya Lahore is called the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement (GAI). At 
the beginning of the spread, Ahmadiyah synergized with Muhammadiyah in building 
Islamic education and fighting Christianization. In 1929, Muhammadiyah considered the 
"infidels heretical" teachings brought by Ahmadiyah through a fatwa (Beck 2005). Crouch 
(2009) recorded that from 1929 to 2007 there were nine deviant Ahmadiyah fatwas from 
Islamic groups: Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, and MUI. The central and local 
governments from 1976-2008 issued 26 regulations. Fatwas and regulations have not been 
issued since the SKB 3 Ministers were issued. 
Even though there are many fatwas and official regulations on Ahmadiyyah, either JAI 
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or GAI, the fact does not prevent the congregation from praying. It is possible that this 
ongoing activity could be the initial trigger for certain Islamic groups, governments, and 
ordinary citizens to act aggressively. The Setara Institute recorded 15 violations against 
Ahmadiyah in 2007, 193 violations in 2008, 33 violations in 2009, and 50 violations in 2010 
(Firdaus, Hasani, and Naipospos 2011). Violations increased in 2008 due to a wave of mass 
actions in various regions. 
We updated the specific data on the violence experienced by Ahmadiyah from 2011 to 
2019, totaling 33 cases. The data provides information on killings, expulsion, burning of 
congregational houses, burning mosques, destroying mosque facilities, sealing mosques, 
and psychological intimidation. These cases were spread across the islands of Java and 
Nusa Tenggara, more specifically in Bogor, Bekasi, Depok, Sukabumi, Pandeglang, 
Tasikmalaya, Kendal, West Lombok, Surabaya, East Lombok, West Lombok, and 
Mataram. Since Covid-19 hit Indonesia, all parties seem to be holding back on each other. 
Although there are still cases of sealing of mosques by the government (Simbolon 2020), 
this has decreased significantly compared to the previous year. This moment was used by 
JAI to report the acts of violence and psychological intimidation they experienced (BBC 
News Indonesia 2020). 
Based on the data we have generalized, there are several patterns of conflict between 
Ahmadiyah vs certain Islamic groups that were formed. First, the conflict was triggered by 
the Ahmadiyah missionary movement. We suspect that there are ―scouts‖ from certain 
Islamic groups to see the preaching of Ahmadiyah. In the context of government, it is 
known as Bakor Pakem (the Coordinating Board for the Supervision of Beliefs). When it is 
read, mass action will be carried out. According to them, the mass action was not only 
related to the SKB 3 Ministerial regulation regarding the dissemination of interpretations 
and activities that deviate from Islamic principles but also about religious jihad. Mass 
actions will run peacefully when there is an initial intention from the protesters to be 
peaceful, then guarding against the Police, and controlled speeches. When one element is 
not fulfilled, the action will likely end in violence. Sealing and vandalizing mosques 
belonging to Ahmadiyah are the options most frequently carried out by the masses. 
The second pattern is the existence of the MUI Fatwa and the 3 Ministerial Decree 
which become a strong guide for certain Islamic groups and the government to start 
conflicts. Generally, action participants referred to these two sources of law. For law 
enforcement officials, a Governor Regulation (Pergub) or a Regent Regulation (Perbup) 
becomes a guideline that ultimately still refers to the two previous policies. The following 
shows some government narratives when asked about the reasons for sealing. 
 ―To determine the status of Ahmadiyah and their religious rights, there are those 
who have more authority, such as MUI. This sealing is based on the decision of 
the Mayor of Depok which refers to the decision of the Governor of West Java‖ 
(BBC News Indonesia 2017) 
―We only carry out our duties (Main Duties and Functions) ... Our actions are not 
illegal. There are binding rules. SKB 3 Minister, Fatwa MUI 2005, and West Java 
Governor Regulation number 12 of 2011 regarding the prohibition of Ahmadiyah 
activities, and has been stated in the form of Bekasi Mayor Regulation number 40 
of 2011.‖ (Simbolon 2020) 
Third, conflicts occur because law enforcement officials are often late in anticipating 
mass actions. It was even worse when it was found that there were police officers who 
deliberately ignored the destruction of facilities belonging to Ahmadiyah. Hicks (2014) 
describes security engineering during a conflict where existing law enforcement officers do 
not act because there are only a few and are unable to control a large number of people. 
Fourth, there is no retaliation from Ahmadiyah when anarchism occurs. It is as if 
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Ahmadiyah accepts every action taken by the action period as a consequence of their 
religious practice. This possibility is reasoned because of the position of Ahmadiyah as a 
minority that does not have power, either in terms of numbers or access to the law. We 
also note the absence of someone who is influential and has the power to ensure the safety 
of Ahmadiyah. The most common action taken is a complaint to the National Commission 
on Human Rights after an anarchist action has taken place. Since the MUI Fatwa and SKB 
3 of the Minister were present as binding rules, these four patterns of conflict have always 
been repeated. 
 
Religious Dynamics in Colo Village 
God bestows abundant natural wealth for Colo Village, Dewe District, Kudus 
Regency, Central Java Province. Located 11 km from Kota Kudus, Colo Village is located 
at an altitude of 700 m above sea level, which is included in the Muria Mountains area 
(Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Kudus 2020). Knowing the extraordinary natural 
potential, the Kudus Government worked on a tourist village through the excellence of 
Monthel Waterfall, the tomb of Sunan Muria, the tomb of Syech Nurrudin Abul Hasan 
Sadzali's grave, Goa Jepang, homestay in the hills, and other artificial tours. The income of 
Colo Tourism Village comes from tourism. Apart from farming and raising livestock, 
tourism has contributed to attracting a large workforce of 4174 people (Badan Pusat 
Statistik 2019).   
Colo Village has multiple religions and religious rituals. There are three religions 
practiced by the people: Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism. Citizens who embrace Islam 
are further divided into three major groups: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and 
Ahmadiyyah. The majority of residents are affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama, followed by 
Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyyah. Ahmadiyah members-only number 17 families. This has 
only increased by two family heads since 2013. In terms of the number of followers, there 
is no additional finding, only the administrative separation of family cards. Two things can 
be explained: first, Ahmadiyah in Colo Village only developed in the family sphere. When 
our team confirmed the question about followers, the Chairman of the Baitul Dzikir 
Mosque did not speak much, only explaining that they only wanted to practice Islamic law 
peacefully and had no intention of influencing the faith of others. This answer indicated 
that the protests and threats from external parties had a major impact on their preaching 
patterns. Then, there is an attitude of 'playing it safe' where the congregation puts personal 
safety first. 
―...when we interact, we don't talk about religion (with other residents). We're 
talking about everyday life. (religion) It's sensitive. We are very close to our 
neighbors here. Keep each other calm. Often help each other too if someone 
has a celebration. In the mosque,, we also don't use a mic when we lecture ... To 
keep everyone safe. We are afraid like what happened in other areas." (Interview 
with Ahmadiyah members in June 2018) 
Second, there is no dissemination of religious understanding. Since there was pressure 
from religious authorities, the government, and certain Islamic groups, the Ahmadiyya 
religious orientation in Colo has changed. They only focus on increasing the faith of fellow 
congregation, then do not do da'wah outside the group. This is evidenced by the practice 
of preaching, which is very careful and deliberately closed to outsiders. Baitul Dzikir 
Mosque only uses loudspeakers when saying the call to prayer and performing the five daily 
prayers. The weekly lecture and other da'wah activities are more often carried out in the 
congregation's house in turn. This is also an adaptive strategy to reduce crowd activity in 
mosques. Furthermore, we learned that there was a stance to close the gap in the conflict 
when a member of Nahdatul Ulama started to attend Ahmadiyah's recitation. Wisely, the 
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Imam of the Baitul Dzikir Mosque advised these residents to temporarily not move closer 
to the Colo Ahmadiyah to avoid future slander. Efforts to save the life of the congregation 
take precedence over adding one new follower. 
We found the keywords "safe and peaceful" throughout the interview transcripts. This 
indicates that Ahmadiyah members hope that the ripple of conflict will not reach their 
village. Many efforts have been made by various parties in Colo Village to ensure a peaceful 
life for all. We categorize these efforts: efforts of Ahmadiyya religious leaders, efforts of the 
village government, and efforts of Muslims around Colo Village. An initiative emerged 
from the central JAI to spread the vision of "love for all hatred for none, humanity first." 
The central JAI sends a religious teacher every month to various regions, including Kudus 
Regency. All JAI in Kudus will gather to get religious guidance and knowledge. This 
moment becomes the glue of information between the central and regional JAI. 
The chairman of the Baitul Dzikir Mosque also issued various internal policies such as 
continuing to spread information about 'God is the same, the Prophet we are the same' and 
on one of the walls of the mosque was written the words of tauhid. These two things are 
considered the most important to be conveyed as a sign that JAI in Colo Village does not 
question Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's status as a Prophet or a Mujadid. Then, Ahmadiyah 
members continue the tradition of mingling in society, especially for muamalah, social and 
cultural activities. Before the conflict broke out, social capital in Colo Village had been very 
well developed. Ahmadiyah members and Nahdatul Ulama mingle like neighbors. So it is 
considered difficult to create conflict in the village unless there is pressure from external 
parties. 
―Maybe because this is a village. The people are very close to one another. This 
condition has been around for a long time. Alhamdulillah, residents here are not 
affected by news and incitement from outside parties. Next to my house is an 
NU (Nahdatul Ulama) person, he has a wedding, we help him. Together we 
participate in village cooperation to celebrate Indonesia's independence day. 
Every day we interact, it can be in the fields, at home, or meet on the road… 
But we are aware that we are afraid that what is happening here in Bogor, we 
anticipate by spreading commonalities. From the village government and other 
Islamic leaders, we were also invited to talk they reminded us to refrain.‖ 
(Interview with influential Ahmadiyah figures in June 2018)    
The village government anticipates through policies that have been decided together. 
Participating in the discussion were influential JAI figures in Colo Village, the chairman of 
the Baitul Dzikir mosque, religious figures from Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, and 
Babinsa (Village Guidance Officer). The policy is stated in a "Collective Agreement" signed 
by all participants present. In summary, the contents of the collective agreement are 1) all 
parties must not be influenced by incitement, slander, issues, and news from outside parties 
who want to destroy the peace in Colo Village; 2) if there is a problem related to harmony 
between religious communities, it must be reported to the village or village security; 3) 
always prioritizes deliberation and justice for all parties; 4) the village government has the 
right to impose sanctions on parties that trigger religious conflicts; 5) Ahmadiyah members 
are prohibited from spreading their understanding or preaching outside the group, and; 6) 
all Village residents must maintain an attitude of tolerance and promote an inclusive 
attitude. 
The village government is considered responsive to the development of the conflict. 
This is evidenced by the making of a collective agreement long before the SKB 3 Minister 
is issued. At least until this research is done, there has never been any conflict. This proves 
that all parties consistently adhere to common rules. Ahmadiyah has been very careful in 
this regard. They considered that a joint decision with the village was not enough, therefore 
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internally they made various rules. The chairman of the Baitul Dzikri Mosque explained 
that all efforts were made so that all Ahmadiyah members could continue to live normally. 
This is not only a matter of religion but also a person's survival. 
We consider the Collective Agreement as a precautionary step from all elements of the 
village. However, that is not the only indicator of success. There are still many small 
policies and social capital that play a role. In terms of numbers, Ahmadiyah in Colo is 
classified as very small, with 17 households out of a total population of 4,174 people. This 
small number is easier to monitor. They are the original inhabitants of Colo Village and are 
still one large family who have long decorated village life. From the perspective of 
Nahdiyin and Muhammadiyah residents, close social and economic relations have played 
down the differences in religious understanding between them. There is an attitude of 
reluctance to interfere in someone's faith. Moreover, Nahdiyin residents are known for 
their Wasathiyah (moderate) Islamic principles. 
 
Deliberative Policy as Local Solutions: A Discussion  
This sub-discussion extracts several important points to clarify the field and literature 
findings of our argument. We have proven that national policy is not able to resolve 
conflicts in various regions. The assumption is that if the top-down perspective is 
successful, then the conflict will be much reduced. The presentation of the four patterns of 
JAI conflicts that keep repeating along with data on the increase in the number of conflicts 
is considered sufficient to support this. It is difficult to reduce conflict by only relying on 
one policy because of the many interests that must be accommodated, value battles, and 
contested resources. Unpreparedness during the implementation of the policy, which in 
turn questions the policy output. This causes policies to trigger new conflicts because there 
is public dissatisfaction with the impact of the policies in terms of values, opportunities, or 
needs. 
Every area that has the opportunity for conflict must make a deliberative policy to 
strengthen the national policy. Deliberatives are policy that is decided through interactions 
between citizens, leaders, and decision-makers. This policy brings together all interests 
through participatory policymaking. So that the essence of a deliberative policy is 
communication, group discussion, and consensus. Interestingly, all parties in the 
deliberative room were allowed to participate in discussing issues and proposing policy 
points. Habermas in Hardiman (2009) emphasized that the deliberative axis is in 
deliberation, exploring problems through dialogue, and sharing experiences between the 
parties. 











Source: Researcher analysis, 2020 
The Colo Village Government has gathered various interested parties to produce a 
joint policy. This policy is contained in a Collective Agreement document or 'Perjanjian 














Stakeholder of Conflict 
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requires representation from various parties, a substantial balance, careful consideration of 
participants' arguments, and open information (Simon 1997). But based on field evidence, 
what Fishkin called "equal considerations" was not found. We see that there are several 
points in the collective agreement that are detrimental to JAI. However, it is true what was 
conveyed by Lele (2016) policy has led to a win-lose.  
Based on Perjanjian Bersama, it is when considering the flow of public policymaking in 
general (Dunn 1981; Nugroho 2017). We try to build a deliberative policy flow for religious 
conflicts. It starts with the work of the policy analyst as the party who defines the problem, 
then explains the possible intersections between the problems. Early problem analysts 
conduct various academic and field studies to ascertain the sources of the problem. 
Information can develop from the results of deliberations of all parties because this is one 
of the differences in deliberative patterns that use participatory elements. The final policy 
paper drafted by an analyst is presented during the dialogue. 
The government takes a position as a facilitator of dialogue. This has been practiced in 
cases. Neither the government nor policy analysts must stay out of dialogue to ensure 
decisions are not intervened by any party. All actors must convey all the available 
information. The closure of information will affect policy points and possibly have an 
impact on win-lose. The result of the actor's dialogue is policy points. Policy analysts can 
help build appropriate sentences for each policy point so as not to generate multiple 
interpretations at a later date. Policies can only be decided by all actors involved in the 
conflict, while the government is the party that ratifies the policy. The responsibility for the 
policy is not in the hands of the government, but all actors are obliged to maintain a 
common commitment. Therefore, in a deliberative policy, it is necessary to explain the 
sanctions for actor violations. Finally, the deliberative policy that has been decided must be 
able to support national policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Religion is the staple of life for the people of Indonesia. This urgency allows for 
conflicts to develop with ease. A person will be willing to die when something he believes 
is tarnished. This seemingly simple reason triggered a series of JAI conflicts. Groups that 
feel Islam is being tarnished have carried out various actions with almost the same pattern 
throughout the year. We found four patterns of JAI conflict: the existence of the 
Ahmadiyya da'wah movement, the MUI Fatwa, and Joint Ministerial Decrees (SKB 3 
Menteri) as a strong guide to initiating conflict, negligence of law enforcement officials in 
anticipating mass actions, and the resignation of Ahmadiyah members. In Colo Village, the 
life of Ahmadiyah members tends to be safe and peaceful. This is inseparable from various 
anticipations from the Ahmadiyah and the village government. Ahmadiyah leaders do not 
spread understanding, campaign for equality rather than difference, and preserve a culture 
of participatory socialization with villagers. The government took the initiative to gather 
various parties to make a collective agreement or Perjanjian Bersama. We also found other 
supporting factors: the number of Ahmadiyah members is very small and spread only in 
the family environment, they are indigenous people who have been socializing for a long 
time, Nahdiyin members speak out for Islam Wasathiyah, and the village's social capital has 
been built with strongly. 
Perjanjian Bersama that has been decided by various parties in Colo Village is a best 
practice to support the SKB 3 Menteri. The findings of this study fully support our 
argument. For this framework, we conclude relevant deliberative policies for the context of 
the Ahmadiyah conflict in Indonesia. This is due to two things: a deliberative policy in line 
with the principles of decentralization and Indonesian society which has a communal 
character. We have constructed a deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts. This is 
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based on practices in Colo Village and public policy academic guidelines. This study has 
expanded the research area in the future. The interdisciplinary theme between public policy 
and religious conflict still needs to be explored. We emphasize the need for testing the 
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